Downward Causation III

Almost immediately after posting Downward Causation II, I had realized that my response to Objection 2 is flawed.  I will briefly discuss that here.  Then I will present my proposal for resolving the tension between downward causation and causal closure.  Namely, I will argue for the conceptual possibility of downward causation in the same way that Pascal argued for the conceptual possibility of God as a simple and yet omnipresent entity.  If God is simple in the sense of being unextended and hence indivisible, how is it conceivable that God is present throughout space at any given moment?

Downward Causation II

Continued from Downward Causation I.

Does the thought experiment show the possibility of downward causation?  Not by a long shot.  It needs to be bolstered by further considerations.  At least I hope my response to the first objection (which modifies the thought experiment to involve computers playing chess or kness in a Schroedinger’s Cattish setup) removes the worry about any question-begging appeal to the libertarian position on free will.  Let’s now move on to the second objection, which Aaron was quick to raise in his comment. 

Downward Causation I

Lately I’ve been fiddling with a thought experiment that seems to suggest the causal efficacy of higher-level properties and objects, and have been wondering how such causal efficacy may be compatible with causal closure of the physical (more exactly microphysical) domain.  Since I am gullible and prone to make mistakes I present my half-baked ideas on these matters, in search of further criticism and illumination.